Confronting monetary policy dilemmas: the legacy of Homer Jones by Beryl W. Sprinkel
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1987
FirstAnnualHomerJones Memorial Lecture
Confronting Monetary Policy
Dilemmas: The Legacy of
Homer Jones
Beryl W.Sprinkel
T is an honor to deliver this first annual lecture in
memory of Homer Jones. I first became acquainted
with Homer when writing my thesis at the University
of Chicago, and I found some of his writings to be
particularly useful. When Homer later became Direc-
tor ofResearch at the St.Louis FederalReserve Bank,it
was — like many things in life — not particularly
momentous in itself, but the implications for mone-
taiyeconomics werecertainlyimportant. In his price-
less style, Hany Johnson described Homer Jones as
an oasis in the desert that Keynesian economics
and concern with credit had made of the Federal
Reserve System, [and] the last outpost of classical
monetary cMlization inacancerous culture ofbarbar-
ian bumptiousness.” Only an academic, of course,
could saysomething like that — and aboutan era that
fortunatelyhas longpassed at the Federal Reserve.
Homer Jones should be remembered for many
things, not the least of which is the many people
whoseintellectual developmenthe shapedand whose
professional lives he fostered, He was one of Milton
Friedman’s first teachers — not in economics, but in
insurance and statistics.Miltoncredits himfor provid-
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ing the inspiration that sparked his initial interest in
economics, as well as something more tangible —
getting him a scholarship to attend the University of
Chicago.And, ofcourse, Homerhadastrong influence
onthe professional livesof the manyeconomists who
worked forhim inhis years at the St.Louis Fed.
Homer had an intense respect for the market sys-
tem; that permeated both his economic analysis and
his views about economic policy. His basic policy
prescriptions in macroeconomics reflected this free-
market orientation: a distrust of the efficacy of fine-
tuning anda fundamental beliefin the inherent stabil-
ity of a free market economy. His reliance on the
market approach to problems also extended to inter-
national issues, labor market issues and regulatory
policy. Frommyperspective, the extent to which such
principles have become more generally acceptedas a
basis for public policy decisions is remarkable, not
only in the United States, but in other countries as
well. Both as an Undersecretary at Treasury and as
CEA Chairman, I have been involved, along with of-
ficials from othergovernments, in policy discussions
on issues ranging from agriculture to tax reform. In
governments around the world, there is a greater
recognition ofthe efficiency of the market system in
pricing goods and allocating resources. While much
progress can still be made toward improving public
policy analysis and discussion, the movement toward
greater reliance on market forces is one I applaud, as I
am sure Homerwould as well.
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One particular area where we have made substan-
tial progress by relying on market forces is in the de-
regulation offinancialmarkets andinstitutions. Regu-
lations on interest rates paid by financial institutions
to their depositors havebeen eliminated. Restrictions
on competition within classes offinancialinstitutions
and between different classes have been reduced. In
this area, however, more needs to be accomplished,
and I suspect that Homer would share my desire to
see rapid progress on the Administration’s proposals
for further financialmarket deregulation.
Itwas difficultto be around Homerwithout learning
a great deal from him. He had a remarkable ability to
focus on the practical issues and an impatience with
intellectual pretense and academic irrelevancy. His
technique was to put questions to you — always
pertinent questions, frequently penetrating questions,
sometimesrelentless questions. In sodoing, he forced
you to understand and articulate what you knew,
while discovering what you did not know. He had a
trulyunusual abilityto stimulateyou to search for the
answers. In the St. Louis Fed Research Department, I
am sure that many promising ideas were hatched,
many empirical relations were tested, and many in-
fluential articles resulted directly from Homer’s in-
quiringmind andhis abilityto transmit that interest to
others.
The products ofHomerJones’ styleand approach at
the St. Louis Fed are well known and well respected.
The weeklyand monthly publications ofthe Research
Department, which have now become standard refer-
ences for everyone from undergraduates to White
House officials, were initially Homer’s products. The
St.Louis Fed Research Department became one ofthe
most prominent in the country and its monthly Re-
view became widely respected and earned the stature
of a professional journal. The metamorphosis of the
Research Department, its role in promoting policy-
related research and in providing an alternative point
ofview within the System was what Karl Brunner has
labeled a remarkable institutional event,” made
more remarkable and more influential because it oc-
curred within the System itself
Given the nature of Homer Jones’ legacy, it is ironic
— and perhaps fitting — that we are gathered here to
honor his contributions at a time when there are so
many unanswered questions about the conduct of
monetary policy. The policy issues we face today are
different from those debated by Homer. Most analysts
now accept the important role of monetary policy in
economic performance. Most economists acknowl-
edge an important relation between changes in
money growth and economic activity, although in
recent years there has been much more uncertainty
about the precise form ofthat once-reliable relation-
ship. Fewdoubt, at leastin general terms, thelong-run
linkbetween money growth and inflation. Ratherthan
those fundamentalissues that we debated in the1950s
and 1960s, the policy challenges oftoday relate to the
changed environment in which monetary policy is
now conducted.
In the four years since this expansion began, there
have been substantial changes in both the institu-
tional and economic environment in which monetary
policy must be designed and implemented. These
developments are well known to this audience. The
inflation rate — excluding the effects of the oil price
declines in 1988— has been cut to one-third the 1980
rate. Similarly, interest rates are one-third to one-half
their 1980 levels. Financial deregulation has changed
the institutional structurein which monetarypolicy is
conducted. In this decade, the introduction of NOW
and money market accounts has significantly altered
the composition of the monetary aggregates, and the
relaxation ofrestrictions on deposit interest rates has
led to the inclusion in Ml ofinterest-bearing deposits
which pay market-determined rates of return.
These developments — and possibly others — ap-
pearto be affecting the basic relation between money
and nominal GNPgrowth as indicated by the behavior
of the velocity” of money. Specifically, while there
have always been sizable fluctuations in velocityfrom
one quarter to the next, over longer periods velocity
rose at a reasonably predictable rate of about 3 per-
cent peryear between 1947 and 1981. Since the cycli-
cal peak of 1981, however, velocity has declined at
more than a 3 percent annual rate.
There are a number of plausible explanations for
thisdecline in velocity.However, with thelimited data
available, it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions.
To myknowledge, the most promisinglines of em-
pirical research attempt to relate velocity declines to
the decline in inflation and interest rates and to their
effect on the interest-elasticity of the demand for
money. In therecentperiod ofdeclining interest rates,
the opportunity cost of holding the highly liquid bal-
ances in Ml has fallen, thereby raising desired Ml
balances and suppressing velocity.As market interest
rates change, the public response in terms of moving
in and out ofMl balances isdifficult to predict. In part
this isbecausewe have relativelylittle experience with
deregulated deposit rates and also because it is not
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clearhow depository institutions will adjust deposit
rates to changes in market rates. This implies contin-
ued uncertainty about the futurebehaviorofvelocity.
Overmost of this expansion we have had monetary
growth — particularly in Ml — that, based on the
historical relation with nominal spending and in-
flation,would be viewed asexcessive. Yet,we havenot
had the short-run surge in real growth and nominal
spending that would be expected from such high Ml
growth. Weare therefore left with a difficult dilemma
about the implications ofrecent Ml growth for future
inflation.On that issue, awide range ofopinion exists.
Some forecasters — many of whom are long-time
friends of mine — foresee a major resurgence of in-
flation resulting from the monetarygrowth ofthe past
twoyears. Other analysts discount recent Ml growth
as being the result of financial deregulation, disin-
flation, declining interest rates, or some combination
of such factors.
It is interesting to note, however, that even those
who rely most heavily on money growth as a forecast-
ing tool are not predicting an inflation as high as
would be implied by historical velocity behavior. The
Shadow Open Market Committee, for example, fore-
casts inflation and nominal GNP growth consistent
withtheassumption that velocitygrowth remainswell
belowits postwartrendgrowth path. Neitherthe most
recent Blue Chip forecasts nor the Administration’s
economic projections reflect the expectation that re-
cent Ml growth will be translated into spending and
inflation in accordance with historical velocity behav-
ior.In fact, I know ofno serious, current forecast that
does not implicitly assume continued atypical veloc-
ity behavior, at least overthe coming year.
These and related questions have made the con-
duct of monetary policy particularly difficult over the
course ofthis expansion. It ismyjudgment that in the
context of considerable uncertainty about velocity
growth, the Federal Reserve has done a reasonably
good job balancing the risk of renewed inflation
against the risks associated with too little money
growth. Ido not believe,however,that we canafford to
be complacent about a long continuation of the
money growth we have experienced in recent years.
The Reagan Administration is committed not just to
reducing inflation,but to theultimategoal of restoring
price stability. By distorting price signals and eroding
productive incentives,inflation isapowerful deterrent
to long-term real growth and job creation. Moreover,
high inflation ultimately brings the high costs of re-
ducing the inflation rate — costs that our economy
paidin the recession of1981—82and that are stillbeing
paid in such sectors of our economy as agriculture
and energy. Giventhe inevitable costs associated with
reducing inflation and the importance to long-term
prosperity ofkeeping inflation under control, itwould
be a policyblunder to allow inflation to reaccelerate.
In assessing monetary policy, it is important to
recognize what it can and cannot accomplish. It can-
not smooth out all short-term fluctuations in output,
employment, orthe price level. Norcan it sustain real
growth rates that consistently exceed the economy’s
potential — as determined by underlying rates of
productivity and population growth and trends in
labor force participation. Monetary policy, however,
can deliverreasonable stability oftheprice levelin the
longer run and can avoid being an additional impor-
tant causeofdisturbancesto output and employment
growth in the shorterrun.
Monetary policy has contributed to the success we
have enjoyed in resolving the critical problems that
confronted the U.S. economy when President Reagan
assumed office.The annual inflation ratehas been cut
by two-thirds — from double digit levels in 1979—SOto
about 4 percent for the past fouryears. Interest rates
generally have fallen to about one-third ofthelevels of
sixyears ago.The economy is nowin the 52nd month
of what will soon become the longest peacetime ex-
pansion since World War II. As this expansion has
proceeded, in contrast with the experience in earlier
expansions, the inflation rate and interest rates have
shown no tendency to rise and to bring about the
strains thatledto the endsofearlier expansions.Thus,
the destructive sequence of business cycleswithpro-
gressively rising inflation and interest rates has been
broken, and the foundation has been laidfor sustain-
able real growth with moderate inflation.
The problems that remain in the U.S. economy are
not primarily problems that can be addressed with
monetary policy — beyond its normal role in gradu-
ally moving toward the goal oflong-run price stability,
while avoiding being a source of macroeconomic dis-
turbance. In particular, the critical and related prob-
lems of the large federal deficit and of the large U.S.
trade deficit cannot be resolved by monetary policy.
The federal government has a deficit because the
share of federal spending in GNP has risenwell above
the average share thatfederal revenue has maintained
in GNP for three decades. The solution is to restrain
the absolute growth of federal spending, while eco-
nomic growth raises the absolute level of federal
revenues.
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The UnitedStates hasa tradedeficit because we as a
nation spend morethanthe valueofwhatwe produce.
To finance this excessive spending, we import capital
from the rest of the world in an amount that corre-
sponds to our current account deficit. Excessive fed-
eral spending and corresponding federal borrowing
are an important part oftheproblem — and reversing
them is an important part of the solution. So too are
stronger, internally generated growth and more open
trade policies on the part of our trading partners. We
require a coordinated approach to reducing interna-
tional payments imbalances in an environment that
maintains world economic growth.
I could discuss further the problems of our fiscal
and tradedeficits, aswell as otherproblems ofthe U.S.
economy. However, myexperience even before Iwent
to Washington taught me brevityis avirtue — perhaps
a virtue even more appreciated by audiences than by
speakers.
Among the things that Ihave learned in Washington
— andthere are many — one ofthe most important is
how simple things look from the outside, but how
much more difficult it is when you actually have to
take action and assume the responsibility for itseffect
on peoples’ well-being. In policymaking, things are
seldom simple. Certainly in the macroeconomic field,
where policy tools are blunt and forecasts are fre-
quently wrong, there are risks associated with any
policy decision. Ultimately, policymakers must face
the question: What are the consequences if I am
wrong? Ifnothing else, it is ahumbling experience.
Noone in mymemoryhadlearned this lessonbetter
than Homer Jones. His humble and unpretentious
personal style was reflected in his professional ap-
proach:takenothing forgranted and believeonlywhat
can be justified by the data. So what would Homer
haveto sayaboutthe current dilemma? I liketo tellmy
staff— someof them thinkI tellthem toooften — that
I’mfrom the “Show-Me”State. Iwant to seethe datato
support a conclusion. While Homer wasn’t born in
Missouri as I was, he certainly adopted the show-me
attitude about economic issues. Knowing his insis-
tence that policy be based on empirically tested rela-
tions, he surelywould share the concerns about high
money growth over the past few years. He surely
would not easilydiscard long-term empirical relation-
ships. But Ialso doubt that he would counselignoring
current developments as they have varied dramati-
cally fromhistorical patterns.
Given the aberrant behavior ofvelocityoverthe past
four years or so, policymakers have little alternative
but to supplement the information provided by the
monetary aggregates with other relevant data. To me,
this implies looking in addition at interest rates, ex-
change rates, sensitive prices such as gold and other
commodities, forward markets, and measures of real
economic activity for signals as to the meaning and
implication of money growth and monetary policy
actions. The limitations and deficiencies ofthese data
as guides to monetary policy are great and are well
known, and I will not recount them here. It is not an
ideal approach, but Isee noworkable alternativeat the
present time. To date, I know of no completely satis-
factory explanation ofwhat has happened to velocity.
Whenmore timehas passedin a deregulated and low-
inflation environment, I am confident that reliable
relationships will re-emerge, which I trust can be
identified by appropriate empirical testing. In the in-
terim, policy decisions must be made that properly
balance the risks to the economy of alternatively too
much or too little money growth. As a nation, we
cannot afford the pain and disruption of allowing
inflation to resurge, nor can we afford to risk the
economic consequences of excessive monetary
restriction.
In a sense, the dilemmas and frustrations oftoday’s
policy issueslead those of uswho knew HomerJones
to plead, Homer, where areyou when we needyou?”
For today, we surely could use his quiet, reasoned
assessment of the issues.
Many people accomplish important things in their
lives. I wonderwhether there are not more important
things to be remembered for than what you invented,
discovered, wrote, or built. It may be a more lasting
legacy to be remembered for how you influenced the
thinking and accomplishments ~of others. Among
those of us who call ourselves monetary economists,
fewcan claim that legacy as readily as Homer Jones.
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